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The widely publicized book The Brethren1 has not, in any substantive sense, contributed to
an understanding of the role of the Supreme Court.
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The widely publicized book The Brethren1 has not, in any substan-
tive sense, contributed to an understanding of the role of the Supreme
Court. The Brethren, after all, is essentially a gossip book about the
Justices. Of course, we all like gossip and engage in it. But gossip does
not answer basic questions about the Supreme Court.
Indeed it may be that The Brethren's single contribution to an un-
derstanding of the Supreme Court is its emphasis that the Justices are
human. If this is the case one may well comment, "So What's New?"
I propose to discuss what is myth and what is reality about the
Court's decision making process.
The very first myth which apparently must be laid to rest in every
generation is that the Court has usurped the function of passing upon
the constitutionality of state and federal laws and action. This myth,
always revived during times of storm over the Court, has no solid basis
in history. Chief Justice John Marshall did not write on a clean slate in
asserting in Marbury v. Madison2 the right and duty of the Court to
declare void an act of Congress contravening the Constitution. His ac-
tion was forecast in the debates in the Constitutional Convention and
urged by proponents as one of the solid reasons for the Constitution's
adoption. Professor Charles L. Black, Jr., in his excellent book, The
People and the Court,$ has summarized the historical evidence. It sup-
ports his conclusion that "It seems very clear that the preponderance of
the evidence lies on the side of judicial review."4 And the very first
Congress, composed of men whose memories of the making of the Con-
* Former Justice of the United States Supreme Court and Distinguished Visiting
Professor of Constitutional Law at Nova University Center for the Study of Law, Fall
1980.
1. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979).
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. C.L. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960).
4. Id. at 23.
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stitution were fresh, enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, 5 which, from
that date to this, has expressly authorized the Court to review the con-
stitutionality of state legislation. This enactment was shortly followed
by a succession of laws providing for the Court's ultimate review of
judgments of the lower federal courts. 6
Thus the reality rather than the myth about the Court is that it
exercises judicial review as a consequence of intent as well as tradition.
Judicial review is not a usurped power, but a part of the grand design
to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution as law, supreme law to
which all branches of government -- executive, legislative and judicial,
state and federal - are subject. This is what the Constitution clearly
imports.
The next great myth is that, even though judicial review was in-
tended and is sanctioned, it is nevertheless undemocratic and that
therefore it is to be regarded with alert suspicion and its exercise to be
dimly viewed. The argument has an obvious, albeit superficial, appeal.
The Justices are appointed for life7 and not elected by the people for
limited terms, as the President and Congress are. The latter, so the
argument goes, being representative of the popular will, should have
their way; otherwise, democracy will be forsaken; a guardianship, how-
ever benevolent, negates popular government.
This reasoning, however, overlooks the first facts about our Consti-
tution: that its source is the people. It is the people who mandated that
the individual be protected and safeguarded in his constitutional rights
even against the popular will of the moment, as voiced by the legisla-
ture, the executive, or even public opinion polls. In large part, our
courts were entrusted with the responsibility of judicial review to pro-
tect individuals and minorities in their fundamental rights against
abridgment by both government and majorities.
It is not a denial, therefore, but rather a supreme manifestation of
democracy that the fundamental rights of the least among us are pro-
tected from government or transient majorities by the Constitution and
safeguarded by an independent judiciary. History teaches that democ-
5. Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
6. Circuit Court Act of 1801, Ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (1801) (repealed 1802); Act of
March 3, 1803, Ch. 40, 2 Stat. 244 (1803).
7. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 read in conjunction with U.S. CONST. art. III, §
2
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racy and an independent judiciary are one and inseparable. A country
where judges are faithful to the popular will, to the executive, or to the
legislature, rather than to the rule of law, will not be a democratic
country worthy of the name.
Another myth disseminated about the Court is that the Court
reaches out and determines troublesome cases that would be best
avoided. It enters, so it has been said at times, into thickets of contro-
versy. The reality is that the cases which the Court decides are pressed
upon it. It does not seek out cases or invite their filing. Under our Con-
stitution it issues no advisory opinions8 - it decides only actual cases
and controversies.9 These must be genuine and current; otherwise, ju-
risdiction will be summarily declined.
But what of cases seeking protection of political rights - should
not the Court have shunned them? The answer to this is that most of
the cases before the Court deal with public issues of the first moment
in our society - issues like reapportionment - commonly called politi-
cal. As de Tocqueville said, "scarcely any political question arises in
the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial
question." 10
My former colleague Justice Brennan accurately observed in
Baker v. Carr - the germinal decision of the reapportionment cases -
that "the mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right
does not mean it presents a political question. Such an objection is little
more than a play upon words."11 If a claim is justiciable, there is no
escaping the responsibility of decision just because the constitutional
right asserted is a political one.
Whatever the justification in another age or time for seeking out
ways of avoiding decisions on the merits of a case, the temper of the
modern world demands that judges, like men in all walks of public and
private life, avoid escapism, and squarely and frankly confront even the
most controversial and troublesome justiciable problems.
And surely it should be agreed by all supporters and critics of the
Court alike that the least possible justification for the Court to avoid
8. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
10. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (P. Bradley ed. 1954).
11. 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962).
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adjudicating a claim of constitutional right is that the Court may in-
jure itself if it decides the case. Is this not another way of saying that
the Court should avoid unpopular decisions? I have always conceived it
to be the first duty of any judge worthy of the name and office to ab-
jure popularity in decision making. Lord Mansfield long ago stated the
creed of any worthy judge:
I will not do that which my conscience tells me is wrong upon this occa-
sion to gain the huzzas of thousands, or the daily praise of the papers
which come from the press. I will not avoid doing what I think is right;
though it should draw on me the whole artillery of libels; all that false-
hood and malice can invent, or the credulity of a deluded populace can
swallow. . . . Once for all, let it be understood, "that no endeavors of
this kind will influence any man who at present sits here."12
The Court should - the Court must - decide the cases and con-
troversies properly coming before it, however difficult and controversial
they may be, by doing what the justices are appointed and sworn to do.
They must faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the du-
ties of their office and "administer justice . . . according to the best of
[their] . . . abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution
and laws of the United States."'13 Judicial timidity is far more likely to
be the undoing of the Court as an institution than the faithful exercise-
of judicial responsibility.
There is a myth that the Court coddles criminals. In fact, what the
Court is doing can be justified on strict constitutional and stare decisis
grounds.
But the Court's criminal law decisions are fundamental because
they reinforce an old principle that where there is a right, that right
will not remain unenforceable because of the defendant's poverty, igno-
rance or lack of remedy. These decisions lie close to the essence of our
great constitutional liberties. The controversial criminal law decisions
are designed to give practical effect to the protections afforded by the
Bill of Rights, 14 and to deal with the realities of the varying situations
confronting the Court in the area of criminal justice.
12. Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 2562, 98 Eng. Rep. 327, 347 (1770).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1970).
14. U.S. CoNsT. amends. I-X.
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If I am right that the Court's criminal law decisions have in-
creased the effectivensss of our cherished constitutional protections
without significantly affecting the crime rate, then one must recognize
their significance in a democratic society.
As Winston Churchill, then Britain's Home Secretary, said in the
House of Commons on July 20, 1910:
The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime
and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of any country. A calm,
dispassionate recognition of the rights of the accused, and even of the
convicted criminal, against the State - a constant heart-searching by all
charged with the duty of punishment - a desire and eagerness to reha-
bilitate in the world of industry those who have paid their due in the
hard coinage of punishment: tireless efforts towards the discovery of cur-
ative and regenerative processes: unfailing faith that there is a treasure,
if you can only find it, in the heart of every man. These are the symbols,
which, in the treatment of crime and criminal, mark and measure the
stored up strength of a nation and are sign and proof of the living virtue
within it.15
There is a myth that the Court is against states' rights, oblivious
of the great interests of federalism - interests which reflect not only
our history and traditions but which require constant and vigilant at-
tention if we are to avoid over-centralism of our national government
and if we are to preserve viable local government.
There was considerable substance to this myth during three de-
cades early in this century when the Court, in the name of due process,
invalidated social and economic legislation of the states as well as the
nation. But, as current decisions demonstrate, the Court does not strike
down state or federal legislation because it deems laws of this type un-
wise or unsound. The nation and the states are free to experiment, and
never have their interests in federalism been better safeguarded than
they are now by the Court.
But it is asserted that the Court intervenes far more frequently
than in the past to protect individuals in their constitutional rights
against state action. Particularly is this true, so the argument goes, in
connection with criminal prosecutions. The Court, critics charge, is fol-
15. 19 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1354 (1910).
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lowing a double standard: it denies the application of the due process
clause to economic cases; it applies the clause energetically to cases
involving impairment of personal liberties.
There is a simple answer to this charge. There is no evidence that
the framers intended the fifth and fourteenth amendments to deny to
the nation and the states their right of economic experimentation.16
There is every evidence that they intended the Bill of Rights and the
fourteenth amendment to safeguard the fundamental personal rights
and liberties of all persons against governmental impairment or
denial. 17
There is a myth, very popular these days, that the Court is divided
into "liberal" and "conservative" wings, or, as some would put it, into
"activists" and those who practice "judicial restraint." Labels of this
kind are convenient but not accurate. Members of the Court, applying
general constitutional provisions, understandably differ on occasion as
to their meaning and application. This is inevitable in the interpretation
of a document that is both brief and general by a human institution
composed of strong-minded and independent members charged with a
grave and difficult responsibility. But the inappropriateness of these la-
bels becomes apparent upon even the most perfunctory analysis.
A judge may believe, as I did during my tenure on the Court, that
under the Constitution a court without a jury may not adjudge guilty a
defendant charged with serious criminal contempt.1 8 Is he a liberal or a
conservative, particularly where the defendant is a governor resisting
integration of a state university? Is he an activist or a believer in judi-
cial restraint? Or a judge may refuse to hold a litigant or newspaper in
contempt for biting comment on the guilt or innocence of a criminal
16. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Olsen v.
Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421
(1952); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726 (1963).
17. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Aptheker v. Secre-
tary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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defendant.1 9 Is he an activist or a follower of judicial restraint? Is he a
liberal or a conservative? May not the denial of a claim of constitu-
tional right be more activist in its effects upon our constitutional struc-
ture than the allowance of the claim?
Examples could be multiplied, but inevitably the classification of
the justices as liberal or conservative, or activist or believer in judicial
restraint, will depend upon the outlook of, or the criteria employed by;
the classifier.
I could continue this recital of myths about the Court, but I shall
conclude with one that emanates from those who seek to support rather
than condemn the Court. It is the myth that the Supreme Court is
infallible. A simple and correct answer to this myth is the oft-quoted
bon mot of Justice Jackson: "We are not final because we are infallible;
we are infallible because we are final."'20
The reality is that, as a human institution, the Court is bound to
err. It is a tribute to its awareness of human frailty, and the extent to
which the Court seeks to avoid mistakes, that so few really serious ones
have been made in the Court's history. And, of course, it is only proper
to note that reserved to the people is the right to change the course of
the Court's opinions - right or wrong - through the process of consti-
tutional amendment 21
There are more sophisticated mythologists who would seek to pre-
serve the illusion of infallibility by banning dissenting opinions. The
Court, by their lights, would then speak with a single authoritative
voice not to be gainsaid. Some courts in other lands function in this
fashion, burying their differences in a single opinion and judgment. But
I, for one, would not have it this way, for I profoundly believe that in
the long run the Court benefits, and certainly the people do, by the free
expression of dissenting views. They educate and sometimes eventually
prevail, and they always demonstrate that our judicial air, like all of
the air of American life, is - and, God willing, will remain - free.
So long as the Supreme Court sits, myths about it will exist.
Myths are not necessarily all or entirely bad as the literature of my-
thology proves. But because we must live in this world and not in a
19. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964).
20. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
21. U.S. CONST. art. V.
165 1
7
Goldberg: Reflections About The United States Supreme Court
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
166 Nova Law Journal 5:1981
make-believe world, myths about the Court or any other human institu-
tion must yield to reality. Otherwise our society will be the victim of
our fantasies rather than the servant of our purposes.
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